Join BeltRoadImagine workspace and appluad podcasters like Zara
story - ENGLISH LANGUAGE CHANGES CHINAS WAYS TO EDUCATE
china as peace provider ..foreign affairs transcripts. ...sec5...un as peacemaking benchmark? more youth markets win-win
trade partners china .. tech leadership 2025 .. cloud china ..4I

China Report of year 2018 -coming soon slideshow of
18 october 2008 5 year party congress beijing -related women hold sky miracles BRAC economistasean.com BRI 1 2

Global2.0 declarations with 100 friends of Xi Jinping -Xiamen(Brics Plus), Beijing (Belt Road), WEF (Jan 2017), UN 2015, Tajikstan 2013, Beijing 1996


#theeconomist good news youth sustain livelihoods & planet map links- fall 17 edu reports unesco, brookings, world bank- navigating 11 win-win trading zones - China and 10 Latin America. 9 Africa, 8 Med Sea 7 Corridor of Stans and mid east; 6 N America :: EURASIA 5 West Europe 4 East Europe 3 Russia 2 India (including bangladesh myanmar corridor) 1 Pacific East ), 0 Inside China questions text usa 240 316 8157 chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk good news korea (+79 nations) empowered by jinping's aiib2017 take climate goals collaboration race to new level- green big bang 1 2 world record book of job creation help! top 20 Economist challenges

Wednesday, September 19, 2018

China's global vision: Maritime Silk Road forum
CULTURE
CGTN
2018-09-19 19:03 GMT+8
Updated 2018-09-19 19:22 GMT+8
‍The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road China (Guangdong) International Communication Forum kicked off on Wednesday in Zhuhai.
Chinese officials, business tycoons, and company executives gathered in the city at the southern end of the Pearl River Delta in China's Guangdong province to explore the business and cultural aspects of the trade route.
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road was a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, which marks its fifth anniversary this year. 
"Over the past five years, the total trade volume of China with countries along the trade route is registered over five trillion US dollars," said Shen Haixiong, vice minister of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee and president of the China Media Group (CMG), while delivering a speech at the forum.
Shen Haixiong, vice minister of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee and president of the China Media Group attends the forum and delivering a speech on Wednesday in Zhuhai. /CGTN Photo
Shen also opposes the ongoing protectionism and unilateral trade, and urges for the global free trade system to be protected in order to maintain the multilateral trade. He believes in promoting the creation of a community with a shared future for humanity.
Proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping back in 2013, the Maritime Silk Road Forum, which aims to revive the ancient trade routes and strengthen regional inter-communication, bears China's new global vision.
This year, Chinese delegates will be will be discussing how to improve mainland companies, especially how to get those in Guangdong to venture abroad. Guangdong's total import and export volume reached 6.82 trillion yuan with a growth rate of eight percent compared to the previous year, according to a report released at the forum.
(Cover: The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road China International Communication Forum kicks off on Wednesday at Zhuhai in China's southern Guangdong province. /CGTN Photo)

world economic forum opens up 4th industrial revolution hub in beijing - part of triad with san francisco and tokyo

Sunday, September 2, 2018


since arts connections connect with every belt road not just dhaka (and the epicentre of jack's interests from the olympics onwards) we urgently need to connect with chinese people who do podcasts that celebrate china's rebirth as world's co-creativity leader and sustainability's last call-please join in here

do you have bios of the 2016 winners- my memory is they were all chinese- we invited them to a session moderated by amy where they were each given a book on conscious capitalism at the new york film studio john mackey uses - mackey has since been taken over by amazon whose second headquarters chinese american public servants in my home region are waiting to welcome as is bezos best friend sports impressario ted leonsis and his fellow aol billionnaires who now run the 1776 hub amongst other things

ITALY*CHINA WORLD ARTS SQUATED
please ask mostofa to introduce you to ying or marina (the main italy branch of yings work; get started with the italian student exchanges and i can get in with the italian chamber of commerce  in beijingwhom I am known at) one of the group of people around her and connecting thousands of students through open spaces at the bridge cafe owned by lily- we need to build arts connections out of beijing - bangladesh (with exception of japan embassy) is nit interested in that dimension of jack ma yet- as they have been brioefed the pope is the mumner 1 person in europe President CXi wants to meet off camera

additionally wise at 21st c learning is the most connected part of education we need- until brac people visit beijing we are missing all the possibilities of edutech that china leads - we need to find one of yings students who is interested in education and can help you talk to 21st century learning who connect with all these chinese leaders

additionally i very much need to understand anything un organises out of beijing - historically this hasnt been much but guterres has promised this will be more and more-  each year jinping hosts the 6 plus one- notes from this event are hugely important as guterres lagarde jim kim know their work (all sustainability bankers) depends on jinping not on trump (they are not permitted to say this in usa but then the media here is terminally sick)- april 2019's beijing belt raid meeting will be sustainability's most iporant event ever- how can we get student union classes 2018-2019 beamed up to this instead of end;less examination crap

Fortunately architecture however expensive or globally fashionable is local - that is why the mit architecture school rebranded themselves as the digital media lab in the 1990s and its why the committee of 100 was sustained by the world famous chinese american - the one who built the pyramid at the louvre -accidentally the second most important ;person at the c100 is jerry yang who now acts as jacks ma's chief scout at stanford as well as gobetween japan softbank and yahoo japan economistwebs.com alibabauni.com 





the chinese dream connection is that the silk road is about culture and digital and everything youth can newly connect locally with big for small analytics and design- while you need infrasrtucture to begin this every new belt raid bridge is an opportunity to invest in what mark calls sdg economic zones- guterres and jinping are already debating this but as yet they dont really have educators doing the job they need (anywhere except inside china)- that's where javeed's connections with http://www.hujiang.com come in - unfortunately hujiang is shanghai based as is a lot of stuff my frienns needed to be connecting by now but havent - does the design competition have anyone you know well who is shanghai based

we need one page of notes on above by mid october when i will be at the biannual event organised by unctad = at the moment the network which helps jack ma make the most student connections across countries whose leaders still want youth to develop



Friday, August 31, 2018

 
August 31, 2018
Brookings on TwitterBrookings on Facebook
Chinese and U.S. flags are set up for a meeting during a visit by U.S. Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao at China's Ministry of Transport in Beijing, China April 27, 2018. Picture taken April 27, 2018. REUTERS/Jason Lee - RC187D978C20

Principles for managing US-China competition

Although the U.S.-China relationship seems to have deteriorated further and faster than at any point since the establishment of official ties in 1979, enmity is not preordained. To stem the tide, leaders in both countries should work together to set principles for managing competition, writes Ryan Hass. 
Renault cars produced in Turkey and awaiting export throughout Europe, are lined-up in front of ship containers in the port of Koper October 14, 2013. Automotive industry association ACEA said October 16, 2013, that new car registrations in Europe climbed 5.5 percent to 1.19 million vehicles in September, only the third month a gain was recorded in the past two years. But within the European Union, the level of demand was the second lowest on record for the month of September since it began tabulating results for the 27 member states in 2003. Picture taken October 14. REUTERS/Srdjan Zivulovic (SLOVENIA - Tags: TRANSPORT BUSINESS) - BM2E9AF0WYI01

As the trade war worsens, the trade deficit increases

David Dollar argues that despite the ongoing tariff battle between the United States and China, both the U.S. trade deficit with China and the U.S. trade deficit with the world are unlikely to change.

RESEARCH & COMMENTARY

New tariffs escalate the US-China trade war

Why assurances matter in US-Taiwan relations

Reading the political winds: The case for Taiwanese discretion

Why a gender perspective is important for early childhood educators in China

Trump did not solve the North Korea problem in Singapore—in fact, the threat has only grown

Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asia is making progress under the New Southbound Policy

Is anyone winning the US-China trade war?

IN THE NEWS

Can Trump and Xi make a deal on trade? In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Cheng Li says that Xi Jinping has faced intense domestic pressure over the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute, and therefore may be more willing to return to negotiations than Trump. The Wall Street Journal had reported that the leaders may try to reach a deal before the G20 summit in November.
U.S.-China trade talks yield little progress. “I think we’re definitely looking at escalation,” David Dollar told NBC News after recent negotiations failed to move the needle. “Most firms are testifying that this is going to hurt their business if they can’t get their intermediate components from China.”
Trade war is not America's strategic goal against China. In an interview with CGTN(starting around 27 minutes) in Beijing, Cheng Li discussed the U.S.-China trade war, and suggested that "there's a lot of room for change" in tactics between the two countries.

ABOUT THE CHINA CENTER

The John L. Thornton China Center develops timely, independent analysis and policy recommendations to help U.S. and Chinese leaders address key long-term challenges, both in terms of U.S.-China relations and China's internal development. 

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Thursday, August 23, 2018

huawei and zte are great companies bringing 5g social applications to the peoples- sad to see a country like australia is reportedly excluding them from 5g

Sunday, August 19, 2018

Bill Bishop at Sinocism <bill@sinocism.com>
To:
chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk

19 Aug at 04:38

VIEW IN BROWSER
This note was first for my paying subscribers but I decided to unlock it for everyone to read. Feel free to forward it to anyone you think might find it interesting.

Today’s issue is a brief note of some of my takeaways, Monday will return to the more familiar format.

US-China — While we have no public idea what if anything happened at Beidaihe, I heard consistently that the key theme of any discussions about US-China relations that may have occurred was whether it made sense to find a way to make concessions to the US without looking weak, or whether the trade pressure is just one piece of a multi-dimensional strategy to “thwart China’s rise”. Before you dismiss the idea that President Trump could be strategic remember that there are some very knowledgeable, “hawkish” and experienced “China hands” working in key parts of the bureaucracy. And even if there is not one the Chinese side will always lean towards embracing the idea of a broader conspiracy and strategy.

I believe that Xi has decided the US is intent on keeping China down, and while there may be some exploratory efforts to see if a palatable deal exists that mitigates some of the worst of the trade tensions for as long as possible, I do not expect the PRC side to make concessions approaching those demanded by the US in May, even if they are now being slightly watered down. Assuming President Trump holds firm, the tariffs and other measures will likely only increase in intensity over the coming months, perhaps until one or both sides have felt enough pain to reconsider.

Outside the trade issues I see little reason for optimism. If Xi and his team have come to believe the real goal of the US is to keep China down across all dimensions then we should expect much more friction and competition. Bloomberg had an interesting story Friday about this shift. I would not be surprised if we spoke to some of the same people:

A common suspicion ran through the conversations -- that the tariffs are just a small part of Trump’s plan to prevent China from overtaking the U.S. as the world’s largest economy. Several people expressed concern that the two nations may be heading into a long struggle for global dominance that recalls the last century’s rivalry between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

“The trade war has prompted thinking in China on whether a new cold war has begun,” said An Gang, a senior research fellow at the Pangoal Institution, an independent research group in Beijing whose experts include former government officials. The dispute, he says, “now has military and strategic implications” -- reflecting concern among some in Beijing that tensions could spill over into Taiwan, the South China Sea and North Korea.

I go further than the Bloomberg reporters in reiterating that I think this shift has already occurred conceptually, and now we should start looking for more concrete actions.

Economy—I did not find anyone who thought it was doing well, and ways to get family and money out remain a popular conversation topic. But since I first went to China in 1989 I do not remember any year where the economy was doing particularly well, though certainly there were years where it was easier to make (and steal) money. I understand that President Trump and some of his top advisors on China believe the PRC economy is in worse shape than it is, and that with enough pressure from the US, the economy and the political system may crack. That certainly is possible, but I do not see it and I hope the policymakers have a Plan B if in fact this is assumption is a significant part of their calculations. Maybe it is just far worse than ever now and I am too jaded, but I am still looking for a credible explanation of how the mechanics of collapse might actually work in this unique political and economic system, especially since the security services are much more hardened, technologically capable and empowered than they were in 2007-8.

Politics—I got no sense from anyone I consider serious that Xi is in any real trouble. There is definitely grumbling, and some now refer to Xi as 圣上 Sheng4shang4, “his majesty”. But there has always been grumbling among the Beijing chattering classes, and it is a far cry from grumbling to a significant challenge. Of all the recent articles discussing the rumored trouble for Xi, some of them quite breathless, I still think the best one has been How to read summer grumbles about China’s swaggering leader - On the Xi side, beside the sea by Economist Beijing bureau chief David Rennie. Rennie, who just left DC after 6 years, wrote:

Xi critics can be correct without posing him any tangible threat. Chinese intellectuals have been transfixed by a coruscating, erudite essay by a Tsinghua University law professor, Xu Zhangrun. The essay, which draws on centuries-old traditions of scholars petitioning the mighty, condemns the Communist leader for his draconian security policies, for eliminating term limits on the presidency, and for reviving Maoist-style propaganda, political campaigns and purges. Mr Xu charges China’s ruler with breaking the bargain underpinning the post-Mao era, that the people will tolerate one-party rule as long as they are left alone to seek prosperity and personal contentment. But its bravery is tinged with something close to snobbery. As masterfully translated by Geremie Barmé, an Australian sinologist, Mr Xu calls urban China “all very comfy and petit-bourgeois”. It is a telling line. Many Chinese reformists of the sort that foreigners meet loathe Mr Xi’s upending of post-Mao norms. But their grumbles are eerily similar to those that can be heard at Washington dinner parties, when academics or veterans of the Bush and Obama White Houses deplore Mr Trump and those voters taken in by him. Those Beltway critics don’t wield much clout.

Again, I may be a bit too jaded (I do worry about this a lot) and conspiracy-minded but I do think it is worth considering if Xi, a student of Chairman Mao, might see opportunity in tolerating some elite grumbling, as it highlights people who need to get more attention, including in the new patriotic campaign for intellectuals that was announced publicly at the end of July in a circular dated June 29, well before Xu Zhangrun’s letter.

For People’s Daily tea leaf readers, Xi’s photo has not appeared on page 1 of the People’s Daily since July 29. In 2017 it was absent from page 1 from August 3 to August 18. Last August 1 was the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA so there were some significant celebrations. In 2016 there was no picture of him in the August 1 or August 2 editions. His visual “absence” from the Party paper so far does not seem strange, and he has been in the news chairing a Politburo Standing Committee meeting on August 16, though no videos or photos have been released from the meeting.

As of this issue I have not seen or heard any thing approaching convincing speculation let alone evidence that Xi’s position has been in any way challenged or weakened. I could be wrong but at this point I would caution against buying into the rumors that have been flying around. But if we go another week with no picture of Xi in the People’s Daily then I may have to eat this newsletter…

[Sunday update: Xi has “reappeared”, chairing a meeting on Party Building in the PLA with the Central Military Commission that lasted over parts of three days from August 17-19-习近平:全面加强新时代我军党的领导和党的建设工作 为开创强军事业新局面提供坚强政治保证-新华网; Xi requires strengthening CPC leadership, Party building in military - Xinhua. He looks rested and maybe a little thinner?]

I recommend this article by Zach Dorfman - Botched CIA Communications System Helped Blow Cover of Chinese Agents:

It was considered one of the CIA’s worst failures in decades: Over a two-year period starting in late 2010, Chinese authorities systematically dismantled the agency’s network of agents across the country, executing dozens of suspected U.S. spies. But since then, a question has loomed over the entire debacle.

How were the Chinese able to roll up the network?

Now, nearly eight years later, it appears that the agency botched the communication system it used to interact with its sources, according to five current and former intelligence officials. The CIA had imported the system from its Middle East operations, where the online environment was considerably less hazardous, and apparently underestimated China’s ability to penetrate it…

The former officials also said the real number of CIA assets and those in their orbit executed by China during the two-year period was around 30, though some sources spoke of higher figures. The New York Times, which first reported the story last year, put the number at “more than a dozen.” All the CIA assets detained by Chinese intelligence around this time were eventually killed, the former officials said.

If this account is accurate, it matters not only because it shows shocking negligence but also because US intelligence likely went from having decent visibility into the PRC leadership and its intentions through the latter years of the Hu Jintao period, to probably being nearly blind as Xi Jinping rose to power and into today. This loss of visibility could not have happened during a worse or more dangerous period. And now we understand better the Party’s recent, increased obsession with foreign spies…

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My vacation made me realize I need some help with the newsletter to reduce the gaps. I have decided to look for paid interns. If you or anyone know anyone who is highly proficient in Chinese and has reasonable expertise around China’s politics, foreign affairs, economics and finance or tech please get in touch. Thanks for reading, and your patience

Tuesday, July 17, 2018

China's Super Platforms: The Impact Question

05 September 2018
Super platforms are generating a lot of buzz in the financial inclusion community because of their potential to maximize scale and reach while embedding digital financial services into successful digital use cases. This is especially the case in China, where tech giants such as Alibaba and Tencent have integrated a range of financial services — from payments to micro-investments — into their product offerings. Yet for all the excitement around super platforms, not enough is known about the impact these platforms are having on low-income consumers’ lives.
To see their effects firsthand, we traveled to China with the Mastercard Foundation’s Partnership for Finance in a Digital Africa, which took 26 leaders from Africa’s digital finance industry around the country to learn and experience how technology and the internet are driving financial inclusion. While China is ahead of many markets in terms of making tech-based business models a reality, the impact question remains ambiguous. Here we try to surface the impact of super platforms at the individual and institutional levels, focusing on three types of digital services commonly offered across super platforms: digital payments, social networks and e-commerce.
Roadside merchant in Yunnan, China, e-banks on her mobile phone.
A merchant in China's Yunnan province uses mobile financial services. Photo: Sudipto Das, 2015 CGAP Photo Contest
Digital payments
In China, mass-market access to smartphones, the omnipresence of QR code-enabled mobile payments and low user fees have reduced the use of physical cash, leading to simpler and faster purchases. Merchants display a QR code sticker, customers scan the code, enter the purchase amount and show the merchant proof of payment before walking away. It’s that simple.
For businesses, QR code-enabled payments reduce the need to keep cash on hand, streamlining sales and insulating them from thieves and counterfeiters. It is hard to quantify these gains in efficiency and cost savings, but they are part of the reason why e-payments now account for 77 percent of all transactions in China, as we learned in our meeting with Tencent.
Digital transaction records generated by mobile payments can also benefit businesses in terms of easier access to credit and improved store management and sales. Providers such as Alibaba and JD Finance offer credit to small businesses using transaction data. Transaction data are also used by shop-management systems, such as Alibaba’s free retail management platform Ling Shou Tong (Retail Integrated), to access customer data to improve inventory management, merchandising and sales.
For customers, digital records of purchases can be used to qualify credit risk and enable access to a variety of loans. Additionally, electronic payments make it easier for people with low incomes to participate in the “sharing economy.” For example, someone who does not have enough money to buy a bike can pay a ride-share company to use one for a short time using a ride-sharing app, such as Ofo. Similarly, a person who owns a motorcycle can offer rides via a ride hailing app.
Social media and networking
Some super platforms have integrated payments into their social network platforms. For example, WeChat now enables users to hail taxis, split restaurant bills, play games or stream videos, all within the app. We see two direct ways in which this marriage of social networking and payments could advance financial inclusion.

CGAP’s Xavier Faz makes a WeChat payment in a grocery store. Video: FiDA Partnership
First, it can make financial services more relevant to users by ensuring they fit into social customs. For example, during the Chinese New Year, families provide their loved ones with red envelopes containing cash. WeChat enables people who cannot physically meet during the holiday — including those living outside China — to send digital red envelopes. During the 2018 new year alone, WeChat users sent $115 million (Y 768 million) worth of digital red envelopes.
Second, social network companies can use the data their customers generate to further extend access to credit. Tencent, the parent company of WeChat, owns a 30 percent share in a bank called WeBank. WeBank uses data from WeChat’s social interactions and monetary exchanges to help manage a loan portfolio with very low default rates. The ability to mix social and financial data to create a robust credit score, even for clients who are traditionally classified as “thin-file” (meaning they have little to no credit history), is particularly relevant in the absence of credit bureaus in China.
E-commerce
E-commerce facilitates trade among parties who would struggle to conduct business if there were not an online mechanism connecting supply to demand over long distances.
For customers, not only does e-commerce enable increased access to a range of products, but it also results in time-savings that may lead to more time being spent on productive activities. In addition to connecting buyers and sellers, e-commerce platforms provide escrow accounts so that buyers have the confidence to purchase goods remotely before they can verify their quality.
For small businesses, e-commerce can help businesses grow by providing access to broader markets (increased sales) and diversifying sales channels. Sales data can also enable financing of working capital. The growth of businesses as a result of e-commerce could have a direct effect on job creation and income generation for local citizens. Alibaba’s rural-focused entity, Cuntao, indicated that their rural ecommerce solution had created more than 1.3 million new jobs nationwide and brought a RMB 180,000 benefit annually to each village. We spoke with suppliers and producers in one of these villages to understand how online marketplaces were influencing their businesses. One shoe factory owner said he dramatically expanded his business through annual advertising on Alibaba coupled with branding support provided by the platform. In just four years, he was employing 200 people and selling 1 million pairs of shoes annually.
Mastercard and CGAP team in China
The Mastercard Foundation and CGAP team outside a shoe factory that is using Chinese e-commerce platforms to expedite growth. Photo: FiDA Partnership
The digital divide
As we saw on our visit to China, there are early indications that super platforms could demonstrate a positive impact on consumers and businesses, especially with respect to efficiency gains, transaction and social media data and access to capital. However, more research is needed to understand the impact these innovations are having on low-income consumers. There has been limited exploration of the impact of platforms “after access,” and this is where the financial inclusion community could allocate more resources. Perhaps the next step in the China discussion is to begin identifying the impact of super platforms on different user segments, including low-income women, youth and rural residents. What do super platforms mean in terms of job creation, self-employment and changes in income and expenditures? Or in terms of access to education, upward mobility and gender equality?
Emerging examples of impact stories can help us understand where to marshal our efforts when advancing digital financial inclusion. Actors such as CGAP and the Mastercard Foundation can contribute to building the evidence-base on the impact that digital financial services can have on low-income clients in emerging markets.